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Abstract
In this paper, we provide a philosophical account of the value
of creative systems for individuals and society. We character-
ize creativity in very broad philosophical terms, encompass-
ing natural, existential, and social creative processes, such as
natural evolution and entrepreneurship, and explain why cre-
ativity understood in this way is instrumental for advancing
human well-being in the long term. We then explain why
current mainstream AI tends to be anti-creative, which means
that there are moral costs of employing this type of AI in hu-
man endeavors, although computational systems that involve
creativity are on the rise. In conclusion, there is an argu-
ment for ethics to be more hospitable to creativity-enabling
AI, which can also be in a trade-off with other values pro-
moted in AI ethics, such as its explainability and accuracy.
Introduction
Creativity is beneficial to many aspects of human life, from
the natural to the individual, to the social level. Current
mainstream AI systems risk hindering processes that en-
able creativity and thus risk to reduce their benefits. In this
contribution, we argue for the ethical and social benefits of
creativity, identify the potential threats of AI for creativity,
and present AI systems that enable creativity. The scope of
our argument concerns both creative AI (i.e. AI generating
valuable novelty directly) and creativity-enabling AI (i.e. AI
that enables or favors the generation of valuable novelty by
humans). We reason that by creating a bridge between the
fields of AI ethics/philosophy and computational creativity
(CC), and highlighting the threats of mainstream AI on hu-
man well-being, the societal uptake of CC can be promoted
and lead to focal research in the field.
Most philosophical definitions of creativity involve the
creation of something novel (Gaut 2010) i.e. originality.
Something can be new in the sense of it being the first time
that it has been produced in history (H-creativity) or in a per-
sons life (P-creativity) (Boden 1991). The dominant tradi-
tions see creativity as essentially related to the production of
something valuable (Gaut 2010), i.e. creativity is essentially
not just novelty, but valuable novelty. We shall not assume
that a process condition - e.g. a special form of indepen-
dence from past models (Kronfeldner 2009) - defines what
creativity is. On the contrary, we shall show that certain pro-
cesses just happen to favor creativity, i.e. favor or enable the
production of valuable novelty. Thus the attribution of cre-
ativity to certain processes is based on observations and does
not result from a choice of definition.
Processes enabling creativity
Natural creativity. The natural evolution of living enti-
ties fits our definition of a creative process. This view has
been influential for attempts to model creativity computa-
tionally (Campbell 1960) as evolution, clearly, involves the
production of novelty (H creativity) (Boden 2018), which is
valuable for the organism (i.e. adaptive) or as a means to
humankind. This kind of creativity is Darwinian, in that it
is based on blind variation and subsequent selection. Blind
genetic variation may not be random, but it is at least un-
directed(Boden 2018).
Social creativity. The collective dimension of creativity is
enabled by liberty, both social and economic liberty. So-
cial liberty allows for individual and collective experiments
of life (Mill 1859) and for discovering new forms of so-
cial value previously thought impossible, e.g. stable rela-
tionship grounded in homosexual love and sexual conduct.
The different forms of the good, in Mills view, cannot be
discovered by pure intellectual acts of understanding, but
must be lived out concretely (Anderson 1991). Creativity is
also expressed by markets (the creative destruction of capi-
tal) (Schumpeter 1965). Markets resemble natural systems,
even if product innovations are not random or undirected,
but on the whole they are rather bets on future success.
Since most entrepreneurs do not know whether their enter-
prise will succeed, the market is (in the short term) a highly
inefficient system: predicting company success is highly in-
accurate and 90% of startups fail. Yet, in order to produce
the novelties that we highly value, [n]atural and nature like
systems want some overconfidence on the part of individual
economic agents, [...] provided that their failure does not
impact others [...](Taleb 2012). Individual entrepreneurial
ignorance works like a high-risk bet, which enables explo-
ration (i.e. of unknown and unpredictable consumer prefer-
ences) and is ultimately responsible for generating valuable
novelty for consumers.
Individual existential creativity. In the individual dimen-
sion, creativity requires the individuals attitude of exploring
life possibilities and experimenting life plans and versions
of herself. In this process, the individual deepens the knowl-
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edge of herself, acquires life experience, and tests the life
track that she previously chose. Individual existential cre-
ativity is thus not exclusively the purview of the artist, but of
any individual that adopts the exploration of life opportuni-
ties and her potential as a pivotal value in her life. Individ-
ual existential creativity refers to how the individual is lead-
ing her life; therefore, it can be assessed with the standards
of the philosophical conception of prudence. While, in the
common meaning, prudence is conceived as a cautious atti-
tude toward risk and danger, in philosophy, it is the pursuit
of ones own good throughout a lifetime. Individual existen-
tial creativity contributes to philosophical prudence as it is
a way to live ones life and pursue ones good. One funda-
mental attitude that enables creativity is the openness to the
unbidden, which is a disposition of recognition and accep-
tance that not everything is, or should be, under one’s con-
trol (Sandel 2007). The openness to the unbidden favors the
acceptance of a world sometimes characterized by extreme
variability and a mental disposition in which not everything
has to be planned in detail. For example, the inclination of
a parent to accept his or her child, however unexpected and
different the child ends up being from the parent, accommo-
dates biological variance. Creativity in life also involves the
individual’s experimentation with different possible selves,
namely trying various life tracks, each realizing a different
idea of herself. Typically, in our culture, the experimentation
phase has been confined to adolescence and the consolida-
tion and exploitation phase to all later life stages. However,
it is likely that in the future, with an increasing acceleration
of social change and technology, life-plans will be built in
such a way that experimentation phases can also occur later
in life. This will require society to both encourage openness
and experimentation during people’s lifespans and govern-
ments to provide a safety net to help them start again, in
case of failure.
What these processes have in common
Summarizing the cross-domain analysis so far, we can list
the following features of processes enabling creativity:
1. some degree of randomness, or at least, undirected pro-
cesses, or at the very least non-fully-rationally-directed
processes (e.g. processes directed in ways that are ra-
tionally defective or that lack rationality altogether). At
the natural level, we have random mutations; at the social
level, we have free initiative in markets and creative pur-
suits; and at the individual level, we have experimentation
with a set of values and commitments that do not have a
guaranteed payoff.
2. the generation of more variance than in the case of non-
random, directed, and fully rational processes. For exam-
ple, new life forms emerge through mutations, new needs
are discovered when new products and services are in-
vented, and new forms of life and values are discovered
through social experimentation.
3. the generation of costs, that is, additional costs compared
to non-random, directed, and fully rational processes.
These processes are wasteful, and can even generate harm
(e.g. harmful mutation). At the natural level, life evolves
Figure 1: Creative processes and threats
in spite (and because of) many failed experiments. At the
social level, resources are wasted, for example by failed
businesses. At the individual level, the costs of creativity
lay in the inefficient pursuit of a plan, commitment, ca-
reer, etc. In fact, when the individual pursues a high-risk
plan, she may end up with less satisfaction, happiness,
and resources than with a low risk-plan, and the costs of
recovery may be high.
4. limited reach of the damage, and part-is-sacrificed-for-
the-whole principle. Most mutations are harmful but bio-
logical processes are flexible, most start-ups fail but con-
sumers benefit, some experiments of life may be harmful
to individuals, but societies learn that new forms of the
human good are possible. At the individual level, while
some life experiments pursued in a specific phase of the
individuals life may fail, subsequent experiments would
typically benefit from self-knowledge and knowledge of
reality gained with earlier unsuccessful trials.
Of these four features, (3) is positively harmful, (4) is ben-
eficial, (1) and (2) are valuable as means. Our hypothesis is
that both non-directedness and variance are means to explor-
ing the space of possibilities (and generating knowledge), in
particular, possible biological forms, preferences and needs,
and shapes of the good human life. At the individual level,
what gets explored is the individual’s potential and how to
realize it. This is crucial for self-knowledge and authenticity,
which are arguably essential to well-being (Sumner 1996).
In conclusion, creativity is the production of valuable nov-
elty, which contributes to generating knowledge. The latter
is especially valuable for humans as it enables them to adapt
to the rather unpredictable world outside them and discover
who they, collectively and individually, are.
The threat of current mainstream AI systems
Collective creativity is threatened by AI technologies that
currently prevail. Let us take economic liberty as an exam-
ple. We explained how the individual’s ignorance regarding
the utility function and the willingness to take risks are im-
portant for the system to create novelty. A society in which
decision making is highly informed by intelligent systems
that are trained in a supervised fashion with a narrowly de-
fined utility function that tries to avoid risk will not exhibit
the same exploration power as a system based on the indi-
viduals’ judgments. Moreover, in this new, efficiency-driven
reality, fewer agents will be taking over the decision making
that was previously done by many more individuals. This
leads to uniformity in the decision making process, which
will lead to less diversity in the collective experiments of
life we referred to earlier. However, these are crucial for cre-
ative processes in society. Lastly, we see an additional threat
in the training cycle of these systems. They learn from past
data labelled with relevant outcomes. The more intelligent
systems come to influence decision making in society, the
more they will impoverish their own training data, as the fu-
ture data that serves to train them will over time become in-
creasingly compatible with the original system expectations,
since the data itself is influenced by these systems. The data
will be more and more uniform, leaving many possible re-
gions of the search space unexplored.
At the individual level, many decisions affecting the indi-
viduals opportunities and plans are implemented by systems
based on AI such as recommendation systems and digital
wellness technologies. These systems influence the individ-
uals choice in various ways, by means of the visual presen-
tation of the alternative as well as by the alternatives that
are suggested by the system. These systems have two fea-
tures that result in identity stagnation. First, current AI tech-
nologies maximize the present selfs utility function and thus
present the individual with choice alternatives that satisfy
her current preferences. This implies that such technologies
make identity and preference changes less likely. Second,
the profiling of the future self provided by current AI sys-
tems is based on past data (Mittelstadt et al. 2016). The lat-
ter excludes unlikely but disruptive events from the predic-
tions of the algorithms; therefore, current AI systems nudge
the user to continue on the current life track. This identity
stagnation decreases the individuals overall well-being by
limiting the possibility to experiment with new life tracks
and learn from them, and make the attitude of openness to
the unbidden useless, as the user is never provided with un-
expected options.
Computational systems involving creativity
However, not all work in AI is harmful for creative pro-
cesses, on the contrary, and the ICCC conference series are
the living proof of that. Although for this short paper, an
exhaustive survey is out of scope, we would like to give a
short (and certainly incomplete) overview of computational
systems that involve aspects of creativity. To organize this
wide spectrum of systems, we can determine what aspect of
creativity they are focusing on, the creative product or the
creative process, which are two main aspects of study (Said-
Metwaly (2017), among others). Computational work that
focuses on the first aspect includes work on the generation
of unconventional linguistic variations, such as the gener-
ation of metaphors (Veale and Hao 2008), scientific ideas
(Wang et al. 2019), or visual art (Elgammal et al. 2017).
Although automatically generating creative output requires
putting thought into the creative process, the main focus of
these works is on the creative output.
We would like to zoom in on computational work, where
the focus is on the creative process. Some work builds com-
putational models to better understand the cognitive process
of creativity. Works from the field of cognitive science,
for example, have shown evidence that creative people have
more complex semantic network structure and may activate
a wider range of associations across the network than less
creative people (Kenett, Anaki, and Faust 2014).
Other work focuses on creating computational algorithms
that introduce aspects of novelty in the learning process.
Many are from the field of robotics, for example, they de-
scribe situations in which robots need to navigate in an un-
known environment and need to look for novelty in order
to better explore the space and not get stuck in local op-
tima. One type of solutions solves this task by defining a
so-called intrinsic reward (based on the psychological con-
cept of curiosity (Barto (2013), among others). Intrinsically
Motivated Reinforcement Learning (Kaplan and Oudeyer
(2007) among others) basically works as follows: the agent
is rewarded for discovering new patterns in the environment
(Schmidhuber 2010), and it is always in search of novelty.
Other work aims at modelling social creativity specifically
(Saunders 2019). The author reports on experiments, in
which multiple agents with diverse hedonic functions, which
determine levels of interest and actions to be taken, work to-
gether. Another strand of research introduce aspects of nov-
elty in the learning process under the header of evolution-
ary computing (EC). An approach known as Novelty Search
(Lehman and Stanley 2011) searches for behavioral novelty
instead of seeking an objective. Also here, we see EC algo-
rithms that are built to run in a distributed fashion over a pop-
ulation of agents and works in which evolution occurs within
one agent only, usually employing a time-sharing strategy of
genes.
In summary, we find several algorithms that involve as-
pects of creativity. These algorithms exhibit the four char-
acteristics of creative processes we listed previously: as-
pects of undirectedness, generation of variance, generation
of costs in order to increase knowledge, and the part-is-
sacrificed-for-the-whole principle. They also implement
these both at the individual level of single agents and at
the level of social interaction. However, these algorithms
are not the mainstream algorithms that find their way to
the market, where narrowly defined objective-driven high-
accuracy systems prevail. Although even here we recently
see some changes taking place. Recommender systems,
such as video recommendation systems for Youtube, in-
corporate reinforcement learning, and off-policy learning to
avoid ’myopic recommendations’, where the short term re-
ward overshadows long-term user utility in the form of dis-
covery content (Ma et al. 2020). Motivations here come
from trying to optimize the long-term user utility. We feel
that attention to the ethical aspects, related to the threats the
current AI technologies pose, could spearhead the work on
computational creativity.
Conclusion
Individual and collective creativity are ethically valuable be-
cause they are essential to (a) adaptation to the unexpected;
(b) self-knowledge. Both adaptation and self-knowledge are
”permanent interests of man as a progressive being” (Mill
1859). Adaptation is a permanent interest of humanity be-
cause humans face environments that are unpredictable in
the long term. Self-knowledge is essential to well-being be-
cause a life cannot be good for an individual unless it re-
flects her individuality, and individual preferences must be
informed (including, by self-knowledge) in order for happi-
ness to be authentic (Sumner 1996).
Current AI ethics guideline documents (Jobin, Ienca, and
Vayena 2019) mention freedom and autonomy as higher-
order principles. But in those guidelines the focus is on
protecting human freedom and autonomy, typically against
the overreach of poorly controlled AIs. When freedom and
autonomy are addressed, there is no reflection on the idea
that the autonomy and creativity of AIs may also be needed
as enablers of human freedom, autonomy, and well-being.
In our analysis, computational creativity may be needed for
human well-being and it is thus in a trade off with other le-
gitimate goals of AI (e.g. accuracy). We hope that this brief
reflection motivates scholars of computational creativity to
reflect on the ethical importance of their discipline and con-
tribute to AI ethics by researching open questions such as,
how to build systems that integrate computational creativity
with resilience and how to avoid excessive harm.
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